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STARE DECISIS IN AN ORIGINALIST CONGRESS
The 2012 election has highlighted contrasting theories of
American constitutionalism. Several of the Republican presi-
dential candidates made issues of constitutional interpretation
central to their campaigns, from the appropriate respect the
Tenth Amendment ought to command to the constitutionality
of President Barack Obama's healthcare reform law.' Al-
though one might expect that every Republican presidential
candidate would promise to repeal the healthcare law, 2 it is
noteworthy that none has said the law's constitutionality de-
pends on the Supreme Court's judgment. The implication is
that the statute must be repealed as unconstitutional irrespec-
tive of how the Supreme Court rules.3 An implied consensus
emerged among the Republican presidential candidates that
the political branches have an independent duty to evaluate
the constitutionality of legislation. 4 Former House Speaker
1. See Robert Hendin, 10th Amendment up for debate within the Republican
presidential field, CBS NEWS (Aug. 12, 2011), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-
503544_162-20091529-503544.html; see also Susan Page, Labor Day forum starts busy
month for Republican candidates, USA TODAY, Sept. 6, 2011, http://
www.usatoday.com/news/politics/story/2011-09-05/Labor-Day-forum-starts-busy-
month-for-Republican-candidates/50267530/1 (describing GOP candidates
declaring the healthcare reform statute unconstitutional).
2. See Louise Radnofsky, Repeal Health Law? It Won't be Easy, WALL ST. J., Oct.
29, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203687504576655130486
204862.html.
3. Representative, and former candidate, Michele Bachmann made this point
explicitly. E.g., Reid J. Epstein, Michele Bachmann: 'We still need full-scale repeal of
Obamacare,' POLITICO (Sept. 28, 2011, 6:22 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/
stories/0911/64665.html.
4. Amusingly, liberal commentators have met the Republican argument in the
2010 and 2012 election cycles that the Supreme Court is not the only relevant
constitutional interpreter with a combination of confusion and condescension.
See Joel Alicea, Questioning the Supreme Court's Judicial Supremacy, NAT'L REV.
ONLINE, Oct. 25, 2011, http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/281166/
questioning-supreme-court-s-supremacy-joel-alicea [hereinafter Alicea, Ques-
tioning Supremacy] (describing liberal reactions to candidates asserting a consti-
tutional judgment).
Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy
Newt Gingrich went even further and explicitly called for a
rejection of judicial supremacy.-
This is a remarkable development. Political scientists and
legal commentators have long discussed the phenomenon
that Mark Tushnet has labeled the "judicial overhang": the
notion that "[1legislators may define their jobs as excluding
consideration of the Constitution precisely because the
courts are there." 6 It is a notion deeply rooted in judicial su-
premacy over constitutional interpretation. After all, the
thinking goes, if the Supreme Court is the ultimate authority
on constitutional meaning, why should the political branches
bother to take their jobs as constitutional interpreters seri-
ously?7 Examples of this attitude abound. During the debate
over the healthcare bill, then-House Speaker Nancy Pelosi
reacted to a reporter's question concerning the bill's consti-
tutionality by asking the reporter, "Are you serious?"
8
Speaker Pelosi's reaction was not entirely surprising given
that only a few years earlier she described a decision of the
Supreme Court as binding to the point that the decision was
"'almost as if God ha[d] spoken."9
But how are political actors to evaluate the constitutional-
ity of legislation? The rhetoric of the Republican presidential
candidates repeatedly harkens back to the views of the
5. See id.
6. MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 58
(1999).
7. Even the most ardent of judicial supremacists must acknowledge that the
political branches play a role in constitutional interpretation. After all, Congress
necessarily interprets the Constitution whenever it passes legislation. See Jack
M. Balkin, Framework Originalism and the Living Constitution, 103 Nw. U. L. REV.
549, 568 (2009) ("However, every Congressional enactment passed under the
commerce power, and every appropriation under the General Welfare Clause,
involves an implicit interpretation of these clauses, whether or not any court
ever considers them.").
8. Matt Cover, When Asked Where the Constitution Authorizes Congress to Order
Americans To Buy Health Insurance, Pelosi Says: 'Are You Serious?', CNSNEWS.COM
(Oct. 22, 2009), http://www.cnsnews.com/node/55971.
9. Congress assails domain ruling, WASH. TIMES, July 1, 2005,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2005/ul/1/20050701-010419-9346r/?page=l.
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Founders, 0 implying a crude form of originalism. Indeed,
former Speaker Gingrich stated he would adhere to original-
ism when making constitutional judgments as President. 1
The idea of originalist interpretation by the political
branches was given an emphatic and articulate voice by
then-Senator-elect Mike Lee in his 2010 speech to the Feder-
alist Society National Lawyers Convention. Lee offered the
following pledge: "I will not vote for a single piece of legisla-
tion that I can't reconcile with the text and the original un-
derstanding of the U.S. Constitution."
12
Senator Lee's pledge, set against the backdrop of the move
toward extrajudicial constitutional interpretation, leads to an
important question. If Congress did abide by originalism when
evaluating legislation, how would it treat legislative prece-
dents? Would Congress feel unrestrained by the constitutional
judgments of past legislators, or would a form of stare decisis
develop within Congress? 3 The answer depends in part on
whether Congress would adopt a theory of originalism that
accepts the legitimacy of precedent. 14 As a practical matter,
10. Gina Smith, GOP presidential hopefuls court voters at SC forum, HERALD (S.C.),
Sept. 6, 2011, http://www.heraldonline.com/2011/09/06/3342710/white-house-
rivals-court-voters.html (describing how the GOP presidential candidates
"worked to distinguish themselves from the pack and prove their salt as strict
adherers to the U.S. Constitution and the ideology of the nation's founding fa-
thers" at the American Principles Project Palmetto Freedom Forum).
11. Alicea, Questioning Supremacy, supra note 4.
12. Mike Lee, U.S. Senator-Elect, Address at the 2010 Federalist Society National
Lawyers Convention (Nov. 19, 2010) (audio/video available at http://www.fed-
soc.org/publications/pubid.2020/pub-detail.asp).
13. Many of the constitutional judgments of past Congresses also would have
judicial precedents because the Court regularly rules on many of the most impor-
tant pieces of legislation, but the focus of this Note is on the deference that Con-
gress owes past legislative constitutional judgments.
14. Originalist theorists differ strongly on this point. John McGinnis and Michael
Rappaport have argued that the Constitution was enacted against a background
assumption that precedent would play a role in constitutional interpretation, and,
thus, originalism and precedent are not mutually exclusive. See John 0. McGinnis &
Michael B. Rappaport, Reconciling Originalism and Precedent, 103 Nw. U. L. REv. 803,
806-29 (2009). Justice Antonin Scalia does not contend that precedent and original-
ism are reconcilable, but he sees precedent as a necessary "pragmatic exception" to
originalism. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE LAW 140 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997). Judge Robert Bork combines the
pragmatic exception approach with an appeal to the historical understanding of
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however, no originalist legislator could demand a wholesale
return to original meaning; it is implausible that Congress
would restrict its own powers in such a radical way and en-
danger politically popular statutory law. Assuming, then, that
an originalist Congress was one that accepted the legitimacy of
constitutional precedent, would it have any obligations to fol-
low the precedents laid down by past Congresses?
The answer to this question is the project of this Note. It is im-
portant to stress, however, the limited nature of the inquiry. The
concern here is with the normative status of legislative prece-
dents for an originalist Congress: Should an originalist legislator
give any weight to previous legislative constitutional judg-
ments? This Note does not attempt to articulate the specific crite-
ria an originalist legislator (or judge, for that matter) should use
in deciding whether to retain a particular precedent. That ques-
tion is a distinct inquiry for another day.
Part I briefly reviews the literature on originalist extrajudi-
cial constitutional interpretation as well as the scholarship on
legislative stare decisis. Part II examines five common argu-
ments for adherence to precedent in a judicial setting and ana-
lyzes their salience in an originalist legislative context. Fi-
nally, the Conclusion looks back on the analysis in Part II and
offers a view about the relevance of stare decisis for an
originalist Congress that seeks to take constitutional interpre-
tation seriously. This Note argues that stare decisis matters a
great deal less for an originalist Congress than it does for the
Supreme Court. Although that answer might not surprise
many, what is surprising is that there remain good arguments
for giving at least a modicum of respect to precedent in the
originalist legislative context. As it is with originalism gener-
precedent and the "judicial power" granted to the courts in Article III. See ROBERT H.
BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 155-59
(1990). Jonathan Mitchell recently offered an interesting and nuanced way of justify-
ing adherence to some precedents but not others, which depends on a particular
reading of the Supremacy Clause. See generally Jonathan F. Mitchell, Stare Decisis and
Constitutional Text, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2011). By contrast, originalists Michael
Stokes Paulsen and Gary Lawson reject precedent in one form or another. See Gary
Lawson, Mostly Unconstitutional: The Case Against Precedent Revisited, 5 AVE MARIA L.
REV. 1 (2007). See generally MIchael Stokes Paulsen, The Intrinsically Corrupting Influ-
ence of Precedent, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 289 (2005).
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ally, so it is with legislative precedents: "We will have the
dead at our councils."
15
I. EXTRAJUDICIAL ORIGINALISM
Since its modern emergence in the 1970s, 16 originalism has
focused almost exclusively on the judiciary.17 The tunnel vi-
sion of originalist scholars led the late Gary Leedes to com-
plain that originalists "permit the electorally accountable of-
ficials substantial leeway. The Congress can interpret the
tenth amendment and the necessary and proper clause vir-
tually as it pleases."18 To be sure, much has been written on
legislative constitutional interpretation generally,1 9  but
scholars have resisted exploring the implications of original-
ism for Congress.
20
Michael Ramsey's Presidential Originalism at least raised the
issue of how originalism applies outside of the courts, 21 but
his analysis does not account for the complexity of originalist
theory.22 Neal Katyal's brief discussion of congressional
15. G.K. CHESTERTON, ORTHODOXY 85 (1908).
16. Modern originalist theory really began with an article by then-Professor
Robert Bork. See Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment
Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971). The conventional narrative on the development of
originalism is told well by Keith Whittington. See generally Keith E. Whittington,
The New Originalism, 2 GEo. J.L. & PUB POL'Y 599 (2004).
17. Whittington, supra note 16, at 601.
18. Gary C. Leedes, A Critique of Illegitimate Noninterpretivism, 8 U. DAYTON L.
REV. 533, 539 (1983).
19. See also JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT (1999). See generally
TUSHNET, supra note 6.
20. See Joel Alicea, Originalism and the Legislature, 56 LOY. L. REV. 513, 515-18
(2010) [hereinafter Alicea, Originalism and the Legislature].
21. See Michael D. Ramsey, Presidential Originalism?, 88 B.U. L. REV. 353,
358-62 (2008).
22. For example, Ramsey examines the implications of what he calls "conceptual
originalism" for presidential constitutional interpretation. Id. at 360. By concep-
tual originalism, Ramsey refers to theories that see adherence to the original
meaning as a "necessary consequence of the nature of interpretation or the nature
of constitutional authority .. " Id. Ramsey concludes that this strain of original-
ism has little relevance for the presidency because the Supreme Court does not
follow originalism. See id. at 360-61. As Ramsey puts it, "[I]f the original meaning
is not the law of the land, according to the supreme interpreter of that law, in
what sense can the original meaning be said-even by an originalist-to bind the
Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy
originalism in Impeachment as Congressional Constitutional In-
terpretation employs an instrumentalist view of originalism
whose primary objective is empowering current legislative
majorities. 23 This strain of originalism, once popular,24 has
long since fallen by the wayside as other theories have risen to
take its place. 25 Thus, both Ramsey and Katyal are insuffi-
ciently attentive to the nuances of originalism, which detracts
from their analyses. Two works by the author of this Note-
Originalism and the Legislature26 and An Originalist Con-
gress ?27 attempt to discuss originalist congressional constitu-
tional interpretation while grappling with the intricacies of
originalism. Both papers examine several schools of original-
ist thought and argue that the internal logic of originalism re-
quires going beyond the judiciary and demanding that Con-
gress be originalist.
28
The natural question is how would Congress go about the
business of being originalist? No scholarship has addressed
this question, which provides the motivating force behind
this Note. As stated above, precedent is an obvious starting
point for discussing how an originalist Congress should
evaluate legislation.
On the general topic of legislative stare decisis, some work
has indeed been done. Mark Tushnet's Legislative and Execu-
president?" Id. at 360. Ramsey's analysis blindly assumes judicial supremacy, but
he provides no reason why an originalist president would ignore the binding of
originalism simply because the Supreme Court says nonoriginalism is appropri-
ate. Not only is this assumption without warrant, it is undermined by historical
examples of presidents choosing to exercise constitutional judgment despite con-
trary judicial pronouncements. President Jackson's veto of the bank bill is just one
example. See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SU-
PREMACY: THE PRESIDENCY, THE SUPREME COURT, AND CONSTITUTIONAL LEADER-
SHIP IN U.S. HISTORY 59-61 (2007).
23. Neal Kumar Katyal, Impeachment as Congressional Constitutional Interpretation,
63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 169, 172-79 (2000).
24. See Whittington, supra note 16, at 599-603.
25. See id. at 603-07.
26. See Alicea, Originalism and the Legislature, supra note 20.
27. Joel Alicea, An Originalist Congress?, NAT'L AFF., Winter 2011, at 31 [herein-
after Alicea, An Originalist Congress].
28. See generally Alicea, Originalism and the Legislature, supra note 20; see also
Alicea, An Originalist Congress, supra note 27, at 40-45.
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tive Stare Decisis does an excellent job exploring the political
science behind extrajudicial stare decisis, but it is a largely
descriptive piece. 29 For the most part, it does not address
whether Congress should adhere to stare decisis in its interpre-
tations, which is the subject of this Note. Katyal's article on
impeachment is the only other relevant scholarship in the area
of legislative stare decisis, and it offers a sophisticated argu-
ment for lesser reliance on precedent in a legislative context.30
But Katyal's essay does not assume an originalist Congress,
which affects the analysis of legislative stare decisis.3 1 Nor
does Katyal address some of the arguments in favor of judi-
cial stare decisis that are most interesting to consider in the
context of an originalist Congress.3 2 Thus, there remains a gap
in the literature on congressional constitutional interpretation,
a gap that this Note attempts to fill.
II. STARE DECISIS AND ORIGINALIST CONGRESSIONAL
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
Before turning to the analysis of legislative stare decisis in
an originalist context, it is important to understand why
originalism plays a distinctive role in the analysis. For an
originalist, fidelity to the text's original meaning is obliga-
tory.3 3 Of course, an originalist might think that the original
29. See generally Mark Tushnet, Legislative and Executive Stare Decisis, 83 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1339 (2008).
30. Katyal, supra note 23, at 182-88.
31. See infra Part II.
32. See infra Part ILA, B, D.
33. See Whittington, supra note 16, at 599 ("Originalism regards the discover-
able meaning of the Constitution at the time of its initial adoption as authorita-
tive for purposes of constitutional interpretation in the present."). This is true
no matter which school of originalist thought is under examination. Whitting-
ton, for instance, belongs to a group of theorists who see the original meaning
as binding partly as a result of the political theory undergirding its existence-
popular sovereignty. See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETA-
TION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 110-59
(1999). Judge Bork, by contrast, sees originalism as the only way to base consti-
tutional interpretation on "neutral principles" that maintain the balance be-
tween majority and minority tyranny. Bork, supra note 16, at 1-4. For a discus-
sion of other schools of originalist thought and their respective justifications for
originalism, see generally Alicea, Originalism and the Legislature, supra note 20. I
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meaning of the Constitution encompasses the common law
principle of stare decisis B4 but even if the Constitution author-
izes the use of precedent, given the binding status of the orig-
inal meaning, it is clear that the original meaning should be
preferred to precedent as a general rule. Otherwise, the origi-
nal meaning would be relegated to something on par with
precedent, in which case it is difficult to see how originalism
would be distinct from other forms of interpretation where
the original meaning plays a role but is not considered bind-
ing.35 In other words, for an originalist, the default rule is to
follow the original meaning, but he might have good reason
to depart from the original meaning and follow precedent in a
particular case. 6 Because of this ordering, where the original
meaning and precedent are in conflict, the burden is on prec-
edent to show that the original meaning ought not govern.
37 If
stare decisis is a norm in favor of following precedent, it is
obvious from what has been said that originalism makes stare
decisis a weaker principle in the constitutional context than it
is in the statutory one.
In his article, Katyal discusses congressional use of prece-
dent abstracted from any particular theory of interpretation,
should note that I am no longer convinced that the labels I apply to those
schools are accurate, or that I would necessarily group some of the people with-
in those schools the same way were I to write the article again. It nevertheless
provides a good roadmap of several important strains of originalism (and, in
the case of Professor Randy Barnett's theory, a strain that may not be originalist
but is often regarded as so).
34. See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 14, at 806-29.
35. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTION 110 (2005) (listing six different interpretive tools used in constitutional
interpretation, of which the original meaning is one but has no privileged status).
36. Justice Antonin Scalia captured this ranking well when he famously said of
the original meaning that he "adulterate[s] it with the doctrine of stare decisis .....
Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 861 (1989). He
has also stated that stare decisis is a "pragmatic exception" to his theory of
originalism, implying that the original meaning has primacy in interpretation.
SCALIA, supra note 14, at 140.
37. This standard is easily met in many cases. As Judge Bork once said:
"Whatever might have been the proper ruling after the Civil War, if a judge
today were to decide that paper money is unconstitutional, we would think he
ought to be accompanied not by a law clerk but by a guardian." BORK, supra
note 14, at 155.
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but the analysis above makes it clear that having a theory in
mind could alter the decisional calculus. For an originalist leg-
islator, the arguments in favor of stare decisis begin from a
standpoint of relative weakness compared with some other
theories of constitutional interpretation. Justice Stephen
Breyer, for instance, has repeatedly characterized his theory of
constitutional interpretation as being a six-factored approach,
precedent being one of the considerations.3 8 Under Justice
Breyer's paradigm, even where precedent and the original
meaning conflict, there is no reason to begin with a predispo-
sition against precedent.39 How one evaluates the force of the
arguments in favor of legislative stare decisis will, therefore,
necessarily be colored by the theory of constitutional interpre-
tation adopted by the legislature in question. This will become
clearer with some of the arguments presented below, which
put forward a few of the most common reasons why the judi-
ciary ought to follow precedent.
A. The Rule of Law
In his masterpiece The Concept of Law, the legal philoso-
pher H.L.A. Hart responded to the contentions of legal real-
ism by insisting that, although it is important to acknowl-
edge that there will be policy choices made by judges "at the
fringe," the public only accepts those choices because of the
"prestige gathered by courts from their unquestionably rule-
governed operations over the vast, central areas of the
law." 40 By "rule-governed operations," Hart was referring in
large part to the constraining force of precedent "over the
great mass of ordinary cases . . .
Hart's point touches on the argument made by many Ameri-
can legal scholars that "judicial adherence to constitutional
precedent supports a consensus about the rule of law, specifi-
cally the belief that all organs of government, including the
38. BREYER, supra note 35, at 110.
39. See id.
40. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 150 (1961).
41. Id. at 124.
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Court, are bound by the law." 42 Professor Henry Monaghan has
said that the goal of stare decisis is to "contain, if not minimize,
the existing cynicism that constitutional law is nothing more
than politics carried on in a different forum."
43
Monaghan's argument-tracking that of Hart-seems to be
that stare decisis promotes the appearance of judicial impartial-
ity. Professor Earl Maltz makes a somewhat different but re-
lated claim: "[Blecause judges believe that law should be made
by reference to 'neutral' principles of precedent, those princi-
ples in fact have a strong influence on decision making." 44 For
Maltz, stare decisis not only creates the appearance of imparti-
ality, but it also helps judges to actually be impartial by creat-
ing a cultural norm that influences their thinking. Both the
Monaghan and Maltz arguments go to the idea of the rule of
law: Society must perceive judges to be impartial, and judges in
fact ought to be impartial.
All of this might well be true in the judicial context, but
how would these arguments about the rule of law translate
to an originalist Congress? Maltz's argument is that a norm
in favor of following precedent creates a habit of mind for
judges that helps them to be impartial, and it is a laudable
goal to have legislators be impartial when they evaluate their
own constitutional powers. In fact, as I have argued else-
where, an originalist legislator commits methodological sui-
cide when he allows the political pressures of popular opin-
ion to influence his judgment of original meaning. 4 One
might think that congressional stare decisis would be useful
for inculcating a mindset of impartiality among legislators,
but the analysis at the beginning of Part II shows that no
such norm in favor of following precedent can exist for an
originalist in the constitutional context. The originalist legis-
lator begins with the original meaning, and if there is a prec-
edent that conflicts with that meaning, the default action is
42. Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 723, 752 (1988).
43. Id. at 753.
44. Earl Maltz, The Nature of Precedent, 66 N.C. L. REV. 367, 371 (1988).
45. Alicea, An Originalist Congress, supra note 27, at 43-44.
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to abandon the precedent unless there are compelling rea-
sons not to do so. Maltz's argument is thus inapplicable to
an originalist in constitutional interpretation because no
norm in favor of precedent is possible (though there is a
great deal to be said for it in statutory interpretation). More-
over, the originalist legislator accrues the salutary effects of
stare decisis by binding himself to a method that is ostensi-
bly divorced from politics. In looking to the original mean-
ing rather than precedent, he is substituting historical facts
for previously decided cases, preserving the rule of law ideal
that Maltz prizes.
Maltz's argument for stare decisis may be inapposite for
originalists irrespective of their governmental branch, but
Monaghan's argument that following precedent creates an
important appearance of impartiality is surely true in the
judicial context. Here, however, the difference between
branches plays a key role. Simply put, there is no expectation
that legislators will be impartial. There is a concern that the
actions of the Court are "politics carried on in a different fo-
rum," 46 but with Congress there is no subterfuge-the public
expects politics all the way down. This is why Judge Bork
said that Congress's constitutional judgments "cannot be
principled" in the originalist sense. 47 Monaghan's point only
relates to appearances, and his point is easily dismissed in
the legislative context because the public does not expect
impartiality from the legislative branch.
B. Stability for Entrenched Constitutional Judgments
Monaghan's second justification for stare decisis is that it
promotes "system-wide stability and continuity by ensuring
the survival of governmental norms that have achieved un-
46. Monaghan, supra note 42, at 753.
47. Bork, supra note 16, at 10. Although I think Judge Bork reflects the popu-
lar view that Congress is not impartial, I disagree with his view that Congress
cannot be principled in its constitutional judgments. To concede that Con-
gress's constitutional judgments are unprincipled is, as mentioned above, a
form of methodological suicide. See Alicea, An Originalist Congress, supra note
27, at 43-44.
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surpassed importance in American society." 48 Monaghan is
concerned with the idea of a judiciary that endangers land-
marks in the constitutional and statutory landscape: "To
permit or vindicate challenges to these traditions would 'in-
cite radical and even revolutionary attacks on the legal sta-
tus quo."' 49 He probably has in mind decisions like Brown v.
Board of Education-" or similarly foundational constitutional
judgments. Stare decisis ensures that those judgments re-
main intact because overturning them could lead to a crisis
of legitimacy.
Implicitly, what seems to be driving Monaghan's concern is
the potential lack of popular approval for overturning these
precedents in a judicial context. These concerns are well found-
ed, as shown by Justice Scalia and Judge Bork's stated refusal
to reconsider deeply entrenched constitutional precedents. 5' A
Supreme Court nominee might secretly believe a certain land-
mark constitutional judgment should be overturned, and it is
possible that four Justices could end up on the Court sharing
his view without anyone knowing about it until a decision was
announced. This would be disruptive and upsetting because it
would deprive the electorate of a constitutive part of the consti-
tutional fabric without any input.
By contrast, for Congress to pass legislation disregarding a
fundamental constitutional judgment made by an earlier Con-
gress likely would require the election of 218 House members
and sixty Senators (assuming contemporary filibuster rules re-
main) who were committed to the legislation. If the coalition
won a majority of Congress and managed to pass the legisla-
tion ignoring a landmark legislative precedent, it would be
hard to argue that the constitutional judgment was in any sense
48. Monaghan, supra note 42, at 749.
49. Id. at 750 (quoting H. Jefferson Powell, Parchment Matters: A Meditation on the
Constitution as Text, 71 IOWA L. REv. 1427, 1433 (1984)).
50. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
51. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 14, at 155; SCALIA, supra note 14, at 139 ("The de-
mand that originalists alone 'be true to their lights' and forswear stare decisis is
essentially a demand that they alone render their methodology so disruptive of
the established state of things that it will be useful only as an academic exercise
and not as a workable prescription for judicial governance.").
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a "governmental norm[] that ha[d] achieved unsurpassed im-
portance in American society."
9 2
This argument only goes so far. It is possible that a constitu-
tional issue could arise during a session of Congress that was
not discussed during the previous election season. In that
case, there could be a surprise change in a fundamental con-
stitutional judgment. The opportunity to overturn a surprise
change after an intervening election, however, ameliorates the
potential harm. The people get to have a say on the matter
shortly after the surprise occurs, whereas the Court's deci-
sions are not as subject to popular reaction or correction due
to lifetime tenure and other obvious institutional features. If
those favoring a return to the status quo ante are unable to
muster the political pressure to overturn the surprise change,
it is doubtful that the old constitutional norm was truly fun-
damental. The relative trauma of a dramatic constitutional
change is more easily tempered in the congressional context.
Monaghan's legitimacy rationale for stare decisis is thus
largely inapplicable in the legislative context, although there
are other reasons why it might be wise for Congress to refrain
from disturbing a fundamental constitutional norm.53 More-
over, note that Monaghan's rationale says nothing about con-
stitutional judgments that are too recent to be considered fun-
damental. As regards the system legitimacy argument, a newly
elected Republican majority in 2013 would have no obligation
to respect the constitutional judgment of the 111th Congress
when it passed the healthcare reform bill. The relevance of the
system legitimacy argument to congressional constitutional
interpretation is thus quite limited.
54
52. Monaghan, supra note 42, at 749.
53. See infra Part IIC, E.
54. Although changing a fundamental constitutional judgment might not affect
the institutional legitimacy of Congress, it could-and probably would-affect
how the electorate views the political party that altered the constitutional land-
scape. It is very likely that, as a practical matter, this political factor will be part of
Congress's decision. Few things, however, could be more antithetical to original-
ism than permitting political self-interest to dictate a constitutional result, see
Alicea, An Originalist Congress, supra note 27, at 43-44, and because this Note as-
sumes an originalist legislator who takes originalist constitutional interpretation
seriously, I do not dwell on this significant political influence. The reader may
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C. Predictability and Reliance
One of the most oft-repeated rationales for stare decisis is the
need for the law to be predictable so people can plan their af-
fairs: "[P]eople should be able to predict the legal conse-
quences of their actions. Such predictability can only be ob-
tained if judges can be expected to follow precedent in making
their decisions."-' As a corollary to this line of reasoning, it is
contended that to depart from precedent is unfair to those who
relied on the state of the law remaining fixed.-6 Stare decisis
helps minimize detrimental reliance on the law.
Katyal and Maltz disagree about whether the predictability
argument makes sense, but ultimately the argument has force
for an originalist Congress. Katyal convincingly argues that
this virtue of stare decisis would translate into congressional
constitutional interpretation. He points to the interaction of
constitutional law and practical decisions in society:
The Takings Clause, for example, is a powerful inducement
for investment and capital formation. The First Amendment
helps ensure that people will become journalists. Judicial
precedents have obvious force in securing these rights, but
adherence to legislative precedent may also help contribute
to stability in both the corporate and individual sectors.
57
At the same time, Katyal qualifies the value of legislative
stare decisis by noting that "predictability may be elusive"
because of the many issues Congress addresses and the in-
numerable variations of fact patterns. 58 This latter point does
not seem like a particularly strong argument from Katyal be-
cause the same could be said of virtually any institution set-
ting precedents. Even the Court, with its ability to limit its
object that I assumed the compatibility of originalism and precedent based largely
on political realities, see supra note 14 and accompanying text, but I made that
assumption as a matter of brute fact in order to bypass the debate about reconcil-
ing originalism and precedent. I did not argue-and do not argue-that it is le-
gitimate for Congress to accept the value of precedent in order to curry political
advantage or avoid political liabilities.
55. Maltz, supra note 44, at 368.
56. See id.
57. Katyal, supra note 23, at 187.
58. Id. at 186-87.
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docket, will nonetheless find itself confronted with myriad
scenarios that do not nicely conform to a stated precedential
principle. 59 The inability to account for all future applications
of a precedent is hardly an argument against the value of
precedent as much as it is an acknowledgment of the variety
of human affairs. The solution is to work by analogy and hope
that the precedents provide sufficient guidance.60
Maltz is skeptical of the predictability argument in general.
He argues that "the difficulty with [the] argument is that it re-
lates to the timing of change in law rather than the fact of
change itself." 61 Under this reasoning, "the remedy is not to
require that the unjust precedent remain intact, but rather to
make the announcement of a new rule entirely prospective-a
practice which, although rare, is not unknown."62 Maltz be-
lieves that if institutions make their constitutional judgments
apply prospectively when they depart from precedent, it great-
ly reduces the harms of detrimental reliance.
Maltz is correct in that his solution deals with many of the
harms of detrimental reliance; it would not, however, solve
the problem of individuals who engaged in long-term in-
vestments based on the law. His argument misses the larger
point-that is, the problem of uncertainty created by frequent
changes in the law. A climate of uncertainty is problematic
economically and as a matter of vindicating individual
rights. 63 Prospective application does nothing to cure these
ailments. In a legislative context, where changes in the law
would tend to be prospective, 64 the problem of uncertainty
remains. Indeed, because of the vast amounts of legislation
59. The Court's difficulty formulating a test for obscenity is a well-known ex-
ample of this problem. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 37-39 (1973) (Douglas,
J., dissenting).
60. According to Hart, precedents and statutory framework will usually provide
clear guidance. See HART, supra note 40, at 124.
61. Maltz, supra note 44, at 368.
62. Id. at 369.
63. See Katyal, supra note 23, at 187.
64. This might be part of the basis for the canon of construction that statutes are
not held to be retroactive unless they explicitly say so. See Bowen v. Georgetown
Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988).
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and wide areas of life that Congress attends to every year, 65
frequent changes in congressional constitutional judgments
could have a greater unpredictability effect as compared with
the modest Supreme Court docket.66 Congress would do well
to keep in mind the need for stability and certainty in the law
when deciding which constitutional judgments to reexamine.
D. Efficiency
Justice Benjamin Cardozo, arguing in favor of stare decisis
as a method of conserving judicial resources, wrote that "the
labor of judges would be increased almost to the breaking
point if every past decision could be reopened in every case,
and one could not lay one's own course of bricks on a secure
foundation of the courses laid by others who had gone before
him." 67 Maltz, despite having a few reservations, 68 ultimately
concedes that "the ability to rely on precedent no doubt sim-
plifies the task of judging." 69
One would expect the institutional distinction to be particu-
larly relevant here. It is axiomatic that Congress has far great-
er resources at its disposal than the Court does, and therefore
it seems that concerns about efficiency are not as acute in the
legislative context. But this conclusion does not take into con-
sideration the innumerable programs, policies, and appro-
priations that Congress oversees-all of which would have to
be reexamined for conformity with originalism if respect for
precedent were absent. The reason for this is that Congress
does not have a limited docket, as the Court does. Instead,
Congress is supervising, authorizing, and funding policies all
the time. In addition, whereas only five votes are necessary to
65. Lisa Lerner & Laura Litvan, No Congress Since '60s Makes as Much Law as 111th
Affecting Most Americans, BLOOMBERG, Dec. 22, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/2010-12-22/no-congress-since-1960s-makes-most-laws-for-americans-as-
1llth.html.
66. Henry T. Scott, Note, Burkean Minimalism and the Roberts Court's Docket, 6
GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 753, 753-55 (2008) (discussing the relatively light caseload
of the Roberts Court).
67. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 149 (1921).
68. Maltz, supra note 44, at 370.
69. Id.
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secure a constitutional judgment at the Court, hundreds of
legislators must agree before a congressional judgment is
made. No Congress, no matter how well-staffed, could possi-
bly handle the task of reexamining the constitutionality of
each of these policies and programs.
7
For an originalist Congress, the scale of the problem
would be even greater. Doing originalism well requires a
great deal of work, so much so that one of the principal criti-
cisms of originalist jurisprudence is that it is more of a histo-
rian's art than a lawyer's. 71 True, a mini-cottage industry has
sprung up to research the original meaning of constitutional
provisions, 72 but a great many areas of the Constitution that
originalist scholars have left unexplored could feature prom-
inently in originalist congressional constitutional interpreta-
tion.73 All of these would require extensive research and
analysis, consuming an enormous amount of resources in the
process. Congress would be paralyzed by its efforts to take
originalism seriously.
70. Some have noted that Congress is often overwhelmed enough as it is. Unit-
ed States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 118-19 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Congress is
too busy to do all of its work as carefully as it should.").
71. See Stephen Breyer, Making Our Democracy Work: The Yale Lectures, 120 YALE
L.J. 1999, 2013 (2011) ("In one typical case, for example, the historical approach
would have had us decide how the Ex Post Facto Clause applied to a modem
circumstance by examining a late eighteenth-century American judge's views
about what a mid-eighteenth-century English treatise writer (Blackstone) thought
about a seventeenth-century parliamentary trial of an English bishop. The truth of
the matter is, in my opinion, that none of us could be certain how to answer this
historical question. If history is determinative, the Court should be made up of
nine historians, not nine judges-though I suspect that even nine historians
would have disagreed in the Ex Post Facto Clause case.").
72. See Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611,
650 (1999) ("[T]he past fifteen years has yielded a boon tide of originalist scholar-
ship that has established the original meanings of several clauses that had previ-
ously been shrouded in mystery primarily for want of serious inquiry.").
73. For instance, there has been virtually no scholarship on the original meaning
of the excise taxation power in art. I, sec. 8, cl. 1. Yet several important programs
employ excise taxes, including the original Social Security Act of 1935. See Joel
Alicea, Obamacare and the Excise Tax, NAT'L REV. ONLINE, Sept. 1, 2010,
http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/245270/obamacare-and-excise-tax-joel-
alicea. The only article to consider the original meaning of the tax in depth re-
mains a short, non-academic publication. See id.
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If Congress is to perform its day-to-day tasks, it must as-
sume the constitutionality of the majority of the programs
and policies it previously approved and currently oversees.
This can only be accomplished by adhering to precedent in
those cases. It is critically important to stress that this does
not mean Congress should give a free pass to all programs
and policies; there will surely be major areas of the govern-
ment that merit constitutional reexamination. Congress
should carefully select which areas are most important and
prioritize investigating their constitutionality over the lesser
policies that must be presumed constitutional- at least for
the moment-if the legislature is to function. "Most impor-
tant" might mean those programs that are most ideologically
objectionable to the party in power, those that are most ex-
pensive, those that most clearly stray from original meaning,
or those that set a dangerous nonoriginalist precedent for
future Congresses. There are many factors that might deter-
mine which programs merit closer constitutional scrutiny,
but Congress must be selective or risk being overwhelmed
by its own good intentions.
Nor does this conclusion mean that Congress would be
abandoning the default rule that the original meaning is to
be favored over precedent. Rather, it simply would be rec-
ognizing the reality of limited resources, which is a compel-
ling reason to decline to follow the original meaning. As Jus-
tice Scalia would say, Congress would not be making stare
decisis its originalist philosophy; it would be making "a
pragmatic exception" to that philosophy. 74
E. Tradition and Intellectual Humility
The final set of justifications for stare decisis present related ar-
guments stemming from the thought of Edmund Burke. Katyal
ascribes one these arguments to Anthony Kronman, describing
the argument this way: "The past should be respected for its own
sake, for fidelity to tradition is part of what sets humans apart
from other beings as cultural entities."75 For Burke, who we are is,
74. SCALIA, supra note 14, at 140.
75. Katyal, supra note 23, at 186.
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in a very real sense, the product of what our forebears bequeathed
to us and what we pass on to our descendants. The past is consti-
tutive of the present. That is what makes society "a partnership
not only between those who are living, but between those who
are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born."
76
Once one recognizes the importance of tradition, a related argu-
ment comes into focus, one of intellectual humility:
We are afraid to put men to live and trade each on his own
private stock of reason, because we suspect that this stock in
each man is small, and that the individuals would do better
to avail themselves of the general bank and capital of na-
tions and of ages.77
These two arguments suggest that constitutional interpreters
ought to be wary of overthrowing settled judgments. Not only
would they be abandoning the past that informs their present,
but they also might be striking out in a new direction untried
by experience, something that always requires caution.
Katyal contends that the argument from tradition "applies
equally to the judicial and legislative sectors." 78 For Katyal:
When Congress takes up [a question of constitutional inter-
pretation], it does so within a cultural-legal tradition. To
break away and ignore what has come before slights our
commitment to this tradition, and places us in a world di-
vorced from context.... For Congress to approach these
questions with the arrogance of a philosopher is not only
foolish, it ignores our identity as humans. 79
One might argue that the same holds true for Burke's coun-
sel of intellectual humility. Congress ought not venture out into
unchartered constitutional waters without pausing to reflect on
the danger that those turbulent seas pose to the ship of state.
Respect for tradition and intellectual humility would seem to
apply irrespective of branch.
76. EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 85 (J.G.A. Po-
cock ed., Hackett Publishing Co. 1987) (1790).
77. Id. at 76.
78. Katyal, supra note 23, at 187.
79. Id.
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All of this is true as far as it goes, but there is a significant
qualifier to such a conclusion: Burke respected tradition only
if it could truly be called tradition. A decade-old constitu-
tional precedent does not a tradition make. Burke explained
this in a marvelous passage in Reflections on the Revolution in
France: "[Wle cherish [our prejudices] because they are preju-
dices; and the longer they have lasted the more generally they
have prevailed, the more we cherish them."80 Burke indicates
that only those ideas or practices that have stood the test of
time and that have gained widespread acceptance merit the
kind of respect due to a real tradition.81 It is likely that few
constitutional precedents would meet those criteria. Some
might be long-lasting but have been controversial for much of
their existence, while others may be relatively recent but have
quickly become part of the national constitutional fabric. For
purposes of congressional constitutional interpretation, it is
important to recognize that although Congress ought to re-
spect tradition for its own sake, not all constitutional prece-
dents qualify for that respect.
Similarly, although intellectual humility counsels against
embarking on newfangled constitutional adventures, over-
80. BURKE, supra note 76, at 76. Of course, Burke does not mean "prejudices" in
the modem, pejorative sense of the word, which is tinged with animus toward
minority groups. He is instead referring to a society's common perceptions and
received wisdom about things like human nature and the function of society.
81. One might argue that the Burkean approach introduces a great deal of ar-
bitrariness. What, after all, makes precedent constitutive of us as a people? A
similar criticism has been levied against Justice Scalia's approach to precedent,
which requires deciding which precedents are widely accepted or relied upon
in our constitutional fabric. See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Comment, in A MATTER
OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 14, at 65, 82-83. Such criticisms are not as pow-
erful in the congressional context, however, because of the reality of elections. If
Congress determines that a constitutional judgment is not a tradition that merits
Burkean deference, the People might disagree and express that disagreement at
the next election. Similarly, if Congress refuses to overturn a constitutional
judgment on the basis of tradition, a popular movement can form to pressure
Congress into changing the constitutional norm. The People and their represen-
tatives, through the political process, will determine which constitutional judg-
ments are constitutive of the nation. This electoral check does not exist-or at
least does not exist to nearly the same degree-in the judicial context, which is
why the criticism of Justice Scalia's approach to precedent has more bite in that
institutional setting.
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turning precedent does not necessarily mean one is striking
out on a novel constitutional course. There are many exam-
ples of current constitutional precedents that are actually
radical departures from long-held constitutional traditions,
and overturning those precedents would be reverting back
to what had been tradition. In such instances, there is a body
of national experience with the old ways that existed before
the current precedent was put into place, and Congress is in
a good position to evaluate the consequences of abandoning
the current precedent and restoring the old order. Intellec-
tual humility loses much of its force in that context.
Burkean respect for tradition and the concomitant value of
intellectual humility are thus equally applicable to the legisla-
ture as they are to the judiciary, but these justifications for stare
decisis do not apply equally across the plane of precedent. A
more nuanced view is required.
CONCLUSION
Stare decisis, understood as an "obligation to follow prece-
dent," is a default rule.82 By now it should be clear that the
idea of stare decisis, properly understood, does not apply in
an originalist congressional constitutional context. As with
originalism generally, the default rule in Congress would be
against precedent where it conflicts with the original mean-
ing. The analysis above identifies several reasons why an
originalist Congress ought to respect precedents in certain
situations, but it does not change the presumption in favor of
original meaning. Rather, it provides reasons to depart from
the original meaning with regard to certain precedents.
Although the Court might, for reasons of institutional legiti-
macy, be wise to avoid overturning constitutional judgments
that have become entrenched norms within the society, the le-
gitimacy argument applies weakly in the congressional context.
The disruptive effects of overturning such precedents are far less
serious for Congress because of the political accountability that
comes with elections.
82. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992).
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That does not mean that Congress should go about reex-
amining all precedents that do not conform to the original
meaning. The scale of such a project makes it unrealistic, and
Congress would have to assume the constitutionality of
many programs and policies to function. But this is a rule of
prudence; Congress still would be free to reexamine any
precedent it wished to so long as it does not overwhelm its
own capacity. The efficiency argument thus does not present
a general rule in favor of precedent; rather, it counsels
against being overly ambitious in the legislative quest to re-
store original meaning.
The same can be said of the need to avoid frequent changes
in the law. Uncertainty in the legal regime is undesirable for a
number of reasons, but this does not mean that Congress can-
not change many constitutional precedents and still maintain a
relatively stable legal landscape. The argument indicates the
need to select appropriate precedents to reexamine so as not to
throw the legal system into chaos; it does not provide a reason
to defer to precedent generally.
Finally, Burkean respect for tradition counsels against over-
turning precedents that are constitutive of our constitutional in-
heritance, but few precedents can be said to have achieved that
exalted status. Likewise, the intellectual humility argument loses
much of its force where overturning a precedent would return
the country to an earlier constitutional order. This might be the
case with a great many of the precedents that conflict with origi-
nal meaning because the original meaning arguably governed
for much of the country's history.
83
The result, then, is that although an originalist Congress
might feel more constrained to tackle the constitutional prece-
dents that have become constitutive of who we are as a people,
83. Antonin Scalia, Foreword, in ORIGINALISM: A QUARTER-CENTURY OF DE-
BATE 43 (Steven G. Calabresi ed., 2007) (describing originalism as the once
"dominant mode of interpretation in the courts"). I have argued elsewhere
that it is probably incorrect to equate modern originalism with the originalism
of the nineteenth century, see Alicea, An Originalist Congress, supra note 27, at
38-40, but Justice Scalia is likely correct in saying that some version of the
original meaning was the dominant constitutional tradition for much of the
nation's history.
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nothing in the nature of constitutionalism prevents it from re-
examining most constitutional decisions. The only caveat is
that prudential concerns, such as efficiency and predictability,
argue in favor of a slower, more cautious approach to reevalu-
ating constitutional judgments. The default rule for an original-
ist Congress remains adherence to the original meaning, but
perhaps Senator Lee's pledge not to vote "for a single piece of
legislation that [he] can't reconcile with the text and the origi-
nal understanding of the U.S. Constitution" 4 is a bit too strong.
Subtle differences among constitutional precedents require dif-
ferent approaches to reexamination in light of the original
meaning, and Congress would do well to heed such distinc-
tions. In this way, the vision of originalism for congressional
constitutional interpretation takes its cue from Burke, who de-
scribed in brilliant prose a system that is
never old or middle-aged or young, but, in a condition of
unchangeable constancy, moves on through the varied tenor
of perpetual decay, fall, renovation, and progression. Thus,
by preserving the method of nature in the conduct of the
state, in what we improve we are never wholly new; in what
we retain, we are never wholly obsolete.85
Joel Alicea
84. Mike Lee, U.S. Senator-Elect, Address at the 2010 Federalist Society National
Lawyers Convention (Nov. 19, 2010), (audio/video available at http://www.fed-
soc.org/publications/pubid.2020/pub-detail.asp).
85. BURKE, supra note 76, at 30.

